Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse
Digital Document
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http://hdl.handle.net/11134/20002:860698869
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Creator (cre): Johnson, Drew
Major Advisor (mja): Bar-On, Dorit
Associate Advisor (asa): Lynch, Michael
Associate Advisor (asa): Bloomfield, Paul
Associate Advisor (asa): Lycan, William
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Title
Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse
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Digital Origin |
Digital Origin
born digital
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Description |
Description
Abstract: What is it that we are doing when we make ethical claims and judgments, such as the claim that we morally ought to assist refugees? This dissertation introduces and defends a novel theory of ethical thought and discourse. I begin by identifying the surface features of ethical thought and discourse to be explained, including the realist and cognitivist (i.e. belief-like) appearance of ethical judgments, and the apparent close connection between making a sincere ethical judgment and being motivated to act on it. I examine prominent attempts to explain these features, with a focus on recent ‘hybrid’ theories combining elements of expressivism and cognitivism. Despite their initial promise, I argue that extant hybrid theories are nevertheless committed to problematic semantic, metasemantic, or pragmatic assumptions. I then discuss what I take to be the strongest existing option, ethical neo-expressivism (Bar-On and Chrisman, 2009; Bar-On, Chrisman, and Sias, 2014), and develop it into an explicitly hybrid theory proposing that ethical judgments incorporate both motivationally-charged affective states and moral beliefs. I then supplement this account with a theory of the proper function (following Millikan, 1984) of ethical claims and judgments, arguing that they function simultaneously to track the morally salient features of social situations, and to coordinate our behavior around these features. Finally, I defend one of the cognitivist commitments of the theory – namely, that objective moral knowledge is possible – by applying recent work on the epistemology of fundamental or ‘core’ intellectual commitments (Lynch, 2012; Pritchard, 2016) to the moral realm.
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Degree granting institution (dgg): University of Connecticut
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Use and Reproduction |
Use and Reproduction
These Materials are provided for educational and research purposes only.
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Note
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Degree Name |
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
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Degree Level |
Degree Level
Doctoral
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Degree Discipline |
Degree Discipline
Philosophy
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Local Identifier |
Local Identifier
S_24245523
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