This dissertation investigates foundational concepts in Buddhist philosophy and argues that they can be useful in contemporary ethical discussions concerning non-ideal conditions. Buddhism focuses on suffering as the primary problem of human life, and lays out principles for understanding, minimizing, and transcending suffering within a non-ideal world. The Four Noble Truths set forth the problem of suffering, its cause, its solution, and the means to achieving its solution. Because this is the most basic teaching of Buddhism, it frames inquiries into ethics, metaphysics and other matters in terms of their relevance to furthering or minimizing suffering. I argue that this perspective offers benefits for understanding the pursuit of wellbeing within conditions of oppression, in which agents are faced with additional difficulties in pursuing a good life. I analyze the unique Buddhist concept of skillfulness, which provides ethical action-guidance based on whether actions produce or minimize suffering for oneself and others. I argue that skillfulness can be a useful concept for ethics in non-ideal conditions, because it is agent-centered, adaptable for difficult dilemmas, and attentive to suffering. Using the concept of skillfulness, agents can determine a course of action that considers their capabilities, the welfare of others, and their own pursuit of wellbeing without running into conflicts between different principles and values. I then explore different Buddhist concepts of not-self, and the importance of self-conceptions for ethics and wellbeing. I examine Derek Parfit’s ethically motivated defense of Buddhist bundle-theory, and argue that his interpretation is not the best option for supporting wellbeing and motivating skillful action. I argue instead for a quietist interpretation of not-self, in which the question of whether a self exists is put aside, and instead, the focus rests on the process of self-identification, allowing for more skillful approaches to shaping our own identities. I conclude with a chapter on moral anger, offering a Buddhist analysis of anger and the ways in which it creates suffering for the angry person. I argue that agents facing oppression already suffer burdens to their wellbeing, and that they ought not also be obligated to further burden themselves with moral anger, as some virtue-theoretic and feminist accounts would suggest. I argue that anger is not morally necessary, and carries significant costs to the angry agent, and thus should not be promoted as a morally appropriate attitude. I explore the potential of compassion to perform the duties of anger more skillfully, but acknowledge that no singular attitude is likely to be appropriate in all contexts in which we would typically expect anger.
