Care for Perspective: Liberatory Virtue Analyses of Trust and Distrust
Digital Document
Document
Persons |
Persons
Creator (cre): Kish, Katrina
Major Advisor (mja): Battaly, Heather D.
Associate Advisor (asa): Lynch, Michael
Associate Advisor (asa): Tirrell, Lynne
Associate Advisor (asa): Bloomfield, Paul
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Title |
Title
Title
Care for Perspective: Liberatory Virtue Analyses of Trust and Distrust
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Origin Information |
Origin Information
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Parent Item
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Digital Origin |
Digital Origin
born digital
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Description |
Description
In this dissertation, I ask what is required for those who are already vulnerable, due to systemic injustice, to trust and to distrust. Taking this perspective entails we attend closely to the vulnerabilities following from inappropriate trust and to the benefits of appropriate distrust. By attending to trust’s vulnerabilities and distrust’s benefits, I develop a novel account of trust and distrust which I call the Care for Perspective account. According to the account, trust requires the truster to believe the entrusted will prioritize the truster’s perspective and interests over their own with respect to the entrusted task. This means the truster believes the entrusted will use their discretion carefully and wisely, always centering the truster’s perspective and interests. For those already vulnerable, these conditions can be difficult to satisfy, albeit rightly so. Consider these well-known social patterns: many women and girls distrust not only strange men trailing them at night, but also the men in their own family circles; black feminists distrust white feminists; persons of color distrust the police. For these agents, distrust obtains because the distrusters believe (rightly) that other agents and institutions will not prioritize their perspective and interests over the entrusted’s own. In these cases, distrust is liberatory because it serves to protect marginalized and oppressed agents from further exploitation while navigating sometimes-unavoidable dependence on other agents and social institutions. For marginalized and oppressed agents, trust likewise has liberatory potential. When marginalized and oppressed agents come to trust virtuously, they come to believe that other agents and social institutions will care for them by prioritizing their perspectives and interests over agent or institution’s own. Liberatory trust represents an ideal, a liberatory goal at which to aim. As we aim for liberatory trust, we can use its conditions to guide the design of new institutions and structures which will in turn facilitate its development.
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Organizations |
Organizations
Degree granting institution (dgg): University of Connecticut
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Rights Statement |
Rights Statement
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Use and Reproduction |
Use and Reproduction
These Materials are provided for educational and research purposes only.
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Note |
Note
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Degree Name |
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
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Degree Level |
Degree Level
Ph.D.
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Degree Discipline |
Degree Discipline
Philosophy
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Local Identifier |
Local Identifier
S_46192696
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