Embodiment Constraint on Theories of Affect

Any good theory of emotions should, among other benchmarks, be able to accommodate that emotions can be embodied (I call this the embodiment fact). In particular, it should be able to show that; for every emotion type there is at least one emotion token that is embodied. With this in mind, I will in this dissertation review various well-known philosophical accounts of emotions with the intention of considering whether or not they succeed in capturing such benchmarks. If one or more theories do well on most benchmarks, but fail to do so in regards to embodiment, I will discuss whether it is possible to modify the theory or theories in order to help them do so. If not, I will consider further what a successful theory or theories might look like. To clarify, I am not trying to vindicate or establish a particular account of emotions; it could be that multiple theories are able to include the embodiment fact. Instead, my intention is to narrow down the range of available theories by seeing which ones, if any, can do so.